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Joseph Lupi 
Justification 
It is the central theme of the history of salvation, for justification implies the 
gift of salvation grace. 
With Pelagius, Augustine admitted that men imitate Adam by sinning, and just 
men imitate Christ by leading a good life, but this is not all. At the beginning of his 
treatise on the remission of sins Augustine writes that all those who through 
disobedience break the commandments of God imitate Adam, but we must distinguish 
between a bad example which influences the will of a sinner, and the state in which 
those born in sin find themselves. Holy men imitate Christ by acting justly, but besides 
imitating Christ these holy people have the grace of God working in their souls 
illuminating and justifying them. This grace is also given to baptised infants, who 
quite evidently cannot imitate anyone. Therefore as Christ, in whom we all live, 
besides giving grace and justification to all those who imitate Him, also gives to the 
faithful the mysterious grace of his Holy Spirit, a grace which he infuses mysteriously 
also in infants, so also Adam, in whom we all die, besides giving a bad example to all 
those who imitate him by willingly breaking God's commandments, also left the 
stain of carnal concupiscence in all who are his descendant. 89 One should notice how 
much Augustine insists on the word also: not just imitation, but also something which 
penetrates deeply in man and precedes the action of free will. Justification therefore 
*The first installments of this study appeared in the issues of Melita Theologica LIII (2002) 41-64 
and LIII (2002) 175-184. 
89. Imitantur quidem Adam, quotquot per inobedientiam transgrediuntur mandatum Dei; sed aliud est 
quod exemplum est voluntate peccantibus, aliud quod origo est cum peccato nascentibus. Nam et 
Christus imitantur sancti eius ad sequendam iustitiam ... sed praeter hanc imitationem gratia eius 
illuminationem iustificationemque nostram etiam intrinsecus operatur. .. Haec enim gratia baptizatos 
quoque parvulos suo inserit corpori , qui certe imitari ali quem nondum valent. Sicut ergo ille in quo 
omnes vivificantur, praeter quod se ad iustitiam exemplum imitantibus praebuit, dat etiam sui spiritus 
occultissima fidelibus gratiam, quam latentur infudit et parvulis, sic et ille in quo omnes moriuntur 
praeter quod eis qui praeceptum Domini voluntate transgrediuntur imitationis exemplum est, occulta 
etiam tabe carnal is concupiscentiae suae labificavit in se omnes de sua stirpe venturos (De peccatorum 
meritis et remissione 1,8,10). 
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is not just imitation of Christ, but implies also the infusion of grace in man's souls. 
Augustine considers justification under its two aspects, the negative aspect (remission 
of sins), and the positive aspect (creation of the new man, restoration of God's image 
in man). We have already made references to remission of sins, and so we have now 
to speak about the positive aspect of justification, which is one of the most sublime 
themes in Augustinian anthropology. 
Through sin the image of the Trinity in man was defaced, deformed, obscured, 
and through justification - the work of the Holy Spirit - the image of the Trinity 
from being a defaced image was changed into a beautiful one.90 Some scholars 
have failed to notice this aspect of Augustine's doctrine, and have seen in Augustine's 
writings only references to external justification, perhaps misunderstanding 
Augustine's definition of original sin as concupiscence accompanied with guilt 
(concupiscentia curn reatu). The guilt (reatus) is removed by Baptism, while 
concupiscence remains. Augustine explains this idea of his with a reference to 
personal sins: personal sins, he says, once committed no longer remain actual (ut 
actus), but the guilt (reatus) remains until it is removed by contrition and confession; 
original sin, once remitted by Baptism, is no longer a guilt (reatus) but remains 
actual (ut actus). This explanation induced some scholars to conclude that remission 
is only external, a juridical act: sin remains but is no longer imputable. But this is 
not Augustine's opinion: the guilt (reatus) according to Augustine is completely 
taken away, abolished, cancelled, and this means that innocence has been restored: 
guilt is in opposition to innocence ... God can give innocence back to man, by taking 
away his guilt.91 For Augustine to be without sin (non habere peccatum) means to 
be free from guilt (reum non esse peccati); before God there cannot be any sin if 
there is no guilt; one should never think that sin has not been abolished, but only 
hidden, and therefore still present and alive.93 
Probably Augustine has been misunderstood, because his distinction between 
concupiscence - sin and concupiscence - evil has been ignored. In the just, 
concupiscence is not a sin but an evil, and if Augustine sometimes calls it a sin, it is 
because he is using Biblical language, he is using metaphorical speech, as we have 
already remarked. 
90. a deformi forma formosam transfertur in formam (De Trinitate 15,8,14). 
91. reatus magnus malum innocentiae contrarium ... Deus autem potest hominem, reatu ablato, ad 
innocentiam revocare (Opus imperfectum contra lulianum 8,19). 
92. De nuptiis et concupiscentia 1,26,29. 
93. Nee sic intellegatis ... peccata cooperta sunt, quasi ibi sint et vivant (£narratio in Ps. 31,2,9). 
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Although Augustine, because of his controversy with the Pelagians, insisted 
more on the negative aspect of justification, he did not ignore its positive aspect, 
which for him was much more important. In fact, when not writing controversial 
works, he speaks highly of the positive aspects of justification i.e. man's deification 
and the indwelling of the Holy Spirit in man. Some might think that these themes 
are proper to the Greek Fathers, who insisted on man's deification and Christ's 
divinity (God became man so that men might become gods) against the Arians, and 
insisted on the indwelling of the Holy Ghost in man against the Macedonians who 
denied the divinity of the Holy Spirit. 
Commenting on Psalm 82, Augustine says: "It is quite evident that God has 
called men gods, deified through his grace, not born of his substance ... He who 
justifies is just in himself, not through others. He who justifies also deifies, for 
throughjustifcation we become God's children: 'He gave power to became children 
of God' (Jn 1,12). If we have become sons of God, we are also gods, but this 
through the grace of him who adopted us as his sons." Man's deification will attain 
its full perfection in the eskaton (Sermo 166,4). 
Deification comes through participation in divine life and through love. 
i. Participation in divine life: "as the soul is the life of the body, so God is the 
life of the soul,"94Augustine tells us. When the soul is justified, it participates in a 
life which is not its own, "which is not what she is."95 Augustine clearly distinguishes 
divine life in itself from divine life in man: "Men are not gods through their existence, 
but become gods by participating in the life of Him who is the only one true God."96 
ii. Love of God, in Augustine, is at the centre of man's life, of man's history and 
of the history of salvation: "Adhering to the eternal Creator, we must of necessity 
be influenced by etemity."97 This same idea is espressed elsewhere by Augustine in 
a popular way when he writes: "Everyone is similar to the love he has", then 
concludes: "Are you in love with the world? Then you are of the world. Are you in 
94. Sicut vita corporis anima, sic vita animae Deus (£narratio in Ps. 70,2,3). 
95. Quod non est quod ipsa (In Joannis Evangelium tractatus 9,11). 
96. Homines non existendo sunt dii , sed fiunt participando ill ius qui verus est Deus (£narratio in Ps. 
118,16,1). 
97. Aeterno enim Creatori adhaerentes et nos aeternitate afficiamur necesse est (De vera religione 
10,19). 
200 Joseph Lupi 
love with God, what should I say? would you be God? I dare not say it,but the 
Scriptures say it 'You are gods, sons of the Most High' (Ps 82,6)."98 
For Augustine, man's deification is the effect of the Incarnation and he often 
repeats a saying so dear to the Greek Fathers: "He who was God and became man, 
will make gods those who were men."99 
Briefly, justification does not simply imply a remission of sins, but also 
something deeper: a spiritual renewal on the ontological and moral level which 
brings about man's deification. 
This spiritual renewal implies also the indwelling of the Holy Spirit in man. In 
Epist. 187 (a treatise rather than a letter, on account of its great length) Augustine 
develops his ideas distinguishing the presence of God in creatures from the 
indwelling of the Holy Spirit, and giving reasons for this indwelling. Augustine's 
ideas are briefly the following: 
i. God is everywhere: in seipso ubique totus, as Creator of all things; 
ii. although everywhere as Creator, he is not everywhere through the grace of 
indwelling; 
iii. He is present through the grace of indwelling only in those he made his holy 
temple, freeing them from the powers of darkness and transferring them to the 
kingdom of his beloved Son, a kingdom which had its beginning in rebirth.100 
This presence is not the same in all the just, but depends on their disponibility 
(pro suae capacitatis diversitate). 
v. God also dwells in baptised infants, secretly working in them so that they 
may become his temple, a temple which he perfects in those who persevere. 
vi.God indwells in each just person in as many temples and indwells in all 
together (in the Church) as if in his temple, which in the present time is continually 
harassed by the tempests of the world, but will obtain stability in eternal life, in the 
eskaton. Augustine's anthropological vision of justification is always within his 
ecclesiological vision. Augustine always sees man's justification within his vision 
of the Church. 
98. In epistulam Joannis tractatus 2, 14. 
99. Deus facturus qui homines erant, homo factus est qui Deus erat. 
100. Epistula 187,12,35. 
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Man's justification has three moments: (i) a total remission of sins in Baptism, 
followed by the conferment of the precious gifts of the Holy Spirit; (ii) a continuous 
renewal of the inner life, lasting through one's whole lifetime; (iii) perfect justice 
and immortality at the final resurrection. 
Through Baptism, the remission of sins is complete and immediate, but no 
internal renewal, for concupiscence (the infirmitas) remains and this, so that we 
might fight the good fight and conquer our pride; concupiscence will remain for us 
to struggle against it (ad agonem interea remanet). 
To the Pelagian objection that God could have also cured man from this infrmitas, 
from concupiscence, Augustine answered: "God acts on his own judgement and 
does not receive orders from those who labour under an infirmity." 101 Augustine 
confirmed this answer by a reference to Saint Paul: Christ wanted him to be strong 
but, nevertheless he told him: "My grace is sufficient for you, for my power is 
made perfect in weakness" (2 Cor 12,9). 
Because even the just are subject to concupiscence (the infirmitas), no man can 
be without sin (impeccantia) in this world. Augustine defends his thesis, starting 
from the Scriptures, from those texts which Coelestius had quoted in his Definitiones. 
He had drawn three long lists, one list containing those texts which speak about the 
universal vocation to perfection, a second list with texts showing how easy it is for 
man to observe the commandments, and a third list which insists on man's 
imperfections, and therefore texts which seem to contradict the two other lists. 
Coelestius never tried to find an explanation for the texts contradicting impeccantia, 
and so it was not a difficult matter for Augustine to refute Coelestius, telling him 
that, instead of solving the problem, he was aggravating it because he was making 
his hearers think that the Scriptures contradict themselves. There is no contradiction 
in the Scriptures, says Augustine, because one should distinguish between the Church 
of the future, the Church without blemish or wrinkle, as St Paul says (Eph 5, 27), 
and the Church now in this world: here on earth the Church is full of imperfections, 
only at the eskaton will she appear in all her brightness and perfection. 
Another distinction to be made is between crimes worthy of condemnation 
(crimina damnabilia) and venial sins (peccata venialia). The just should be exempt 
from the crimina damnabilia, but while on earth they will never be free from the 
I 0 I. Hoc utique agit ut sanet omnia, sed agit iudicio suo, nee ordinem sanandi ab aegroto. 
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smallest peccata venialia, the slightest imperfections. The just man on earth is both 
a just man and a sinner (iustus et peccator): There are just men on earth ... but they 
are not without sin ... all are great, all are just, all really worthy of praise, but none 
are without some sin ... they were just but they were not without sin.102 For without 
faults it is impossible to live on earth, one cannot live without sin in this world; 
only the Virgin was exempt from sin because of the Lord (propter honorem Domini). 
The just man knows that he is not perfect and that he must continually strive for 
perfection in a perfect manner (peifecte), trying to avoid daily imperfections, which 
Augustine calls the peccata quotidiana. "This we should realise, that however much 
far have we gone forward on the road of perfection, we are not yet perfect."103 We 
go forward along the road of perfection (peifecte currimus) if we pray, fast and 
give alms; no other means are available in this world and because of the struggle 
between flesh and spirit in us on this earth we will never succeed in loving God 
with all our being, for, although we can control our disorderly passions, we can 
never be without them in this world. Briefly Augustine distinguishes between initial 
justification and complete justification: "Has not Baptism given us rebirth, adoption, 
redemption? and yet we still need rebirth, adoption, redemption, which will only 
be ours at the end of time, while NOW we have to wait patiently so that THEN, 
when the time comes, we will not be in any way children of the world. Those 
therefore who deprive Baptism of what it now gives us, are corrupting the faith, 
while those who attribute to Baptism now what we will only receive through Baptism 
then, are destroying all hope."104 
The distinction helps Augustine in answering another Pelagian objection: If 
death is the consequence of sin, why does death remain once sins have been remitted? 
Augustine answered: "God could have exempted believers from death, so that their 
bodies would not be subjected to death, but if He did this, a kind of pleasure would 
have been given to the flesh, but the strength of faith would have been lessened. 
Men fear death so much that Christians would be considered blessed only because 
they could not die. But God has given a greater grace, for He gave something better 
to those who believe in Him. What greatness those who believed they would not 
102. Sunt ergo in terra iusti sed ... non sunt sine peccato ... omnes sancti, omnes iusti, omnes veraciter 
1audabi1es sunt, sed sine peccato aliquo non sunt . .. et iusti fuerunt et sine peccato non fuerunt. 
103. Quotquot perfecte currimus, hoc sapiamus quod nondum perfecti sumus (De perfectione iustitiae 
hominis 8,10). 
104. Contra duas epistulas Pelagianorum 3,3,5. 
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die would be theirs by believing this during their lifetime? How much greater, how 
much stronger, how much more worthy of praise would they be in believing that by 
dying they would obtain victory over death for all eternity."105 Faith without hope 
is no faith at all: "faith is possible only when what is hoped for is not yet realised." 106 
For Augustine man's progress towards complete justification is a progress 
towards freedom, which is attained through the impossibility of dying (non posse 
mori), through the impossibility of sinning (non posse peccare), which is the greater 
freedom (libertas maior), in contrast to the minor freedom (libertas minor) which 
our first parents enjoyed namely the possibility of not dying (posse non mori) and 
the possibility of not sinning (posse non peccare). 
Justification is a gratuitous gift of God 
Justification is not something we merit through our good deeds: grace is given 
to us not because of our good deeds, but is given to us so that we can perform good 
deeds. 107 Justification is through faith and therefore we have no reason to pride 
ourselves of our good deeds. To prove this Augustine makes use of Pauline texts: 
"What becomes of your boasting? It is excluded" (Rom 3,27) and "Let him he who 
boasts, boast of the Lord" (1 Cor 1,31 ): no one can boast of his merits before God, 
for he has none, or better still, the merits one has are evil and Augustine makes 
refffence to Saint Paul saying that before his conversion his merits were many but 
were all evil. 108 Because we have been justified by the B 1 ood of Christ, "if we 
boast, let us boast of the Lord" for then nothing is more sure, more certain.109 "God's 
justice is ours because it is given to us, and it is called God's justice so that we 
might not think that we have justice through our own efforts. God's justice is grace 
given to us, and is called grace because it is gratuitious, and it is gratuitious because 
it has preceded out merits, God's gifts have preceded us.'' 11 0 
105. Poterat (Deus) . .. hoc (exemptio a morte) donare credentibus, ut nee istius experirentur corporis 
mortem, sed si hoc fecisset, carni quaedam felicitas adderetur, minueretur autem fidei fortitudo. 
Sic enim homines mortem istam timent ut non ob aliud felices dicerent esse christianos, nisi quod 
mori omnino non possent. Sed Deus plus gratiae praestitit, plus fidelibus suis sine dubitatione 
donavit. Quid enim magnum erat vivendo non mori eos qui crederent credere se non moriturum? 
Quanto est maius, quanto fortius, quanto laudabilius ita credere ut se speret moriturus sine fine 
victurum (De peccatorum meritis et remissione 2,3 1 ,50). 
106. Tunc est fides quando expectatur in spe, quam in re nondum videtur (De Civitate Dei 13,4). 
107. De Spiritu et littera 10, 16. 
108. Merita eius erant magna, sed mala (De gratia et Iibera arbitrio 5,12). 
109. Sigloriemurin Domino gloriemur (quia) nihil tutius, nihil securius (Sermo 160, 3). 
110. Erratio in Ps. 30,3. 
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The gratuiousness of justification does not exclude merit. No merits are acquired 
before the gift of faith, before justification, but the just are not without merits. The 
just have become just gratuitiously, because they have been justified, gratuitiously 
through God's grace (Rom 3,24). Merit is so intimately connected with grace, that 
Augustine feels that he must insist that man's merits are gratuitious gifts, and 
therefore he concludes that God does not crown your merits as if they were yours, 
but because they are his 111 and so he invites his hearers to recognise these merits as 
God's gifts. 112 
Augustine also teaches that our hope for eternal reward is strengthened by this 
teaching: God who gave his gifts gratuitiously, will not deny his promises113 ; for 
this reason the just man will speak to God in this manner: "Give us what you 
promised, for we have done what you have commanded, and you yourself have 
done this, for you help us in doing it." 114 
Gratia adiuvans 
We need God's help to obtain justification and persevere in it. What is the nature 
of this help? Is this help necessary? Is it efficatious? Is it gratuitious? Augustine's 
answers to these questions were in contrast with the position taken by the Pelagians. 
According to Augustine,Pelagius identified grace with free will, with God's 
law including the Gospels, with the remission of sins, and with Christ's good 
example. 
i. Pelagius considered human nature created and adorned with free will as a 
grace of God. Augustine replied that this was true in a certain manner (quadam non 
improbanda ratione) for we can call grace what has been given to us at creation so 
that we might be human beings, but the grace we are speaking about is altogether 
different, something vastly superior. Deriding the Pelagians for admitting the grace 
of creation (illam genera/em gratiam qua creatus est homo) and denying the grace 
by means of which we are Christians (illam gratiam qua Christiani sumus), he 
Ill. Deus non coronat merita tua tamquam tua, sed tamquam dona sua (Epistula 194, 5, 19). 
112. Discute bene merita tua et videbis quia dona sunt mea (Senno 131). 
113. Non negabit debitum qui donavit indebitum (Sermo 297,5). 
114. Redde quod promisisti, quia fecimus quod iussisti, et hoc tu fecisti quia laborantes iuvisti (£narratio 
in Ps. 138,2). 
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calls their intelligence a brittle intelligence (vitreum acumen). The Pelagians, 
concludes Augustine, should also admit the grace by means of which we are 
Christians, and the reason for this is the fact that our nature, because of Adam's sin, 
needed a doctor: it asks for a doctor (medicum imploret). May the Pelagians seek 
this medicine (gratia medicinalis quaeratur) so that all controversies might come 
to an end (controversia finiatur). 115 
ii. The Pelagians considered God's law grace for it teaches us how to lead a 
good life; Augustine agreed for God's law is good, holy and useful, prohibits what 
is prohibited (vetat quae vetanda sunt) and commands what must be commanded 
(iubet quae iubenda sunt); but Augustine adds that to observe God's law, the love 
which the Holy Spirit diffuses in our hearts is necessary. 
iii. Augustine agreed with the Pelagians that Christ's good example could be 
considered as a gift given to us by Christ himself; for Augustine the imitation of 
Christ (imitatio Christi) was the summit of all religion (religionis summa); but the 
imitatio Christi is not Christian grace; Christian grace is the caritas we need to 
imitate Christ, to observe God's law, to obtain remission of our sins. What is, 
according to Augustine, the nature of this grace, the nature of the gratia adiuvans? 
From the Scriptures Augustine developes three themes: 
i. "Help us to do what your order, and order what you will". This is a prayer 
coming out of the depths of Augustine's heart which finds its echo in several texts 
from De peccatorum meritis et remissione and from De spiritu et littera; as an 
example we can mention this text: "God himself helps our conversion: when he 
orders us: 'Tum unto me and I will turn unto you;' we say to him: 'Turn unto us, 
God of our salvation' and 'Restore us, o Lord', what else are we saying except 
'Help us to do what you order?' And when he orders us saying 'Do not follow your 
evil desires' and we answer 'We know that no one can be continent without God's 
help' what else are we saying but: 'Order what you will'?"117 
115. De natura et gratia 54,63. 
11 6. Da quod iubes, et iube quod vis (Confessiones 10,29,400). 
117. Uf convertamus, ipse (Deus) adiuvat... Cum ergo nobis iubet:Convertimi ad meet ego convertar 
ad vos, nosque illi dicimus: Converte nos Deus sanitatum nostrarum, et: Deus virtutum converte 
nos, quid aliud dicimus quam: Da quod iubes? ... Cum iubet dicendo: Post concupiscentias tuas 
non eas, nosque dicimus: Scimus nemo esse potest cotinens nisi Deus dat, quid aliad dicimus: Da 
quod iubes? (De peccatorum meritis et remissione 2,5,5.). 
-, 
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ii. "No one can come to me unless the Father who sent me draws him" (Jn 
6,44). Quoting these words of St. John, together with the words John wrote 
further on in the same chapter: "No one can come to me unless it is granted him 
by the Father" (Jn 6,65), Augustine says: "This is the grace which Pelagius 
ought to admit if he really wants to be a Christian and not a Christian in name 
only."lls 
Augustine quotes other Scripture texts; worthy of note is this quotation: 
"Pride has so closed the ears of their heart that they are unable to hear: 'What 
have you that you did not receive?' (1 Cor 4,7); they do not hear: 'Love is of 
God' (1 Jn 4,7); they do not hear: 'Each according to the measure of faith that 
God assigned to him' (Rom 12,3); they do not hear: 'No one can come to me 
unless it is granted him by the Father' (Jn 6,65); they do not hear . .. what the 
Spirit says through Jeremiah: ' I will put the fear of me in their hearts that they 
may not turn from me ' Jer 32,40) ... and especially what has been said through 
Ezechiel". Here Augustine gives a long quotation from the prophet foretelling 
the work of the Spirit (Ez 30, 22-37) " ... a new heart I will give you and a new 
spirit ... I will put within you ... and cause you to walk in my statutes and be 
careful to observe my ordinances ... " 119 
iii. "God's love has been poured into our hearts" (Rom 5,5). Augustine 
summarises his ideas in these words of St. Paul (Augustine usually did this in many 
of his controversies, choosing a Scriptural text which summarised the various 
Biblical texts he quoted in support of his thesis). Augustine used this text numberless 
times during the Pelagian controversy from its beginning: as an example we can 
mention what he says in De Spiritu et littera: after explaining the terms of the 
problem, he says: 
"From what I will prove it would certainly appear more evident that to lead a 
good life is a gift of God not only because God gave man freedom of will, without 
which one can neither lead a good or a bad life, not only because God gave man a 
commandment telling him how he ought to live, but because God's love has been 
poured through the Holy Spirit in the hearts of those whom he foreknew to 
predestinate them, in those whom he predestinated to call them, in those whom he 
118. Hanc debet Pelagius gratiam confiteri, si vult non solum vocari, verum etiam esse Christianum 
(De gratia Christi et de peccato originali I ,10,110). 
119. Contra duas epistulas Pelagianorum 14,6,14. 
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called to justify them, in those whom he justified to glorify them." 120 
Augustine also draws an argument against the Pelagians from Liturgy; with 
regard to original sin his argument from Liturgy was the Baptism of infants; his 
argument now is from prayer, for prayer is a clear proof of the necessity of God's 
grace to help us (gratia adiuvans): if we do not need such a grace why pray for it? 
"Is there anything more foolish than praying for something which is in your 
power?" 121 When one says: "Lead us not into temptation" one does not pray to be 
a man for he is so by nature; nor does one pray for free will for he has received it 
when his nature was created; nor does he ask for the remission of sins as this has 
been asked for in the preceding petition: "Forgive us our trespasses"; nor does he 
pray for knowledge of the commandments, but to be able to obey them ... Who 
prays thus, prays not to sin." Augustine then concludes; "Prayer itself is the clearest 
witness of the necessity of grace." 122 
Augustine also quotes the Fathers, especially Saint Ambrose who for Pelagius 
was among the Latin writers, a flower of great beauty, whose faith, whose 
interpretation of the Scriptures no one dared doubting, not even an enemy123 ; because 
of this regard Pelagius had for Ambrose, Augustine quotes a number of texts against 
Pelagius five of which from Ambrose's commentary on Luke with reference to 
grace, and one from the commentary on Isaiah with reference to the impeccantia. 
Augustine also quotes Cyprian's treatise on the Lord's prayer because Cyprian 
explains the various petitions of the Pater noster by insisting on the necessity of 
prayer. 
Finally Augustine concludes his argument saying (i) that we must admit "a help 
to do good added to our nature and to the instruction in doctrine we have received" 124; 
(ii) this help is something marvellous and ineffable: "In this we see difference 
120. Quod cum ostendero, profecto manifestius apparebit bene vivere donum esse divinum non tantum 
quia homini Deus dedit liberum arbitrium, sine quo nee male nee bene vivitur, non tantum quia 
praeceptum dedit, quod doceat quemadmodum sit vivendum, sed quia per Spiritum sanctum 
diffundit caritatem in cordi bus eorum quos praescivit ut praedestinaret, praedestinavit ut vocaret, 
vocavit ut iustificaret, iustivicavit ut glorificaret (De spiritu et littera). 
121. Quid stultius quam orare ut facias quod in potestate habes (De natura et gratia 18,20). 
122. Epistula 177,4. 
123. De gratia Christi et de peccato originali 1,42,47. 
124. Adiutorium bene agendi adiunctum naturae atque doctrinae (De gratia Christi et peccato originali 
1,36,38). 
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between the Old and New Testaments; the law was written on tables, now it is 
written in our hearts so that what filled us externally with fear now pleases us 
internally; then one became a prevaricator because of a law which killed, now one 
becomes a lover because of a spirit which gives life" 125 ; (iii) that this help 
(adiutorium) is essentially "the inspiration of a beautiful and bright love."126 
Augustine then asks what might be an obstacle to human actions, and answers 
that ignorance (ignorantia) and infirmity (infirmitas) are to blame: "Men refuse to 
do what is just either because what is just is hidden to them or because it does not 
please them. The more ardently we wish for something the more certain we are of 
its goodness and the more ardently will it please us. Ignorance and infirmity are 
therefore those vices which prevent the will from doing what is good or avoiding 
evil. God 's grace is necessary to help man's will so that we might become aware of 
what is hidden to us and how sweet is what was not attracting us." 127 In other words 
ignorantia is the lack of knowledge of the goodness or the evilness of something, 
while the infirmitas makes what is good and just unpleasant to our nature. These 
obstacles are removed by certain knowledge (certam scientiam) and victorious 
pleasure (victricem delectationem) which the good God gives us. The scientia certa 
is not external knowledge, namely the knowledge of Christian doctrine, but it is 
above all the pleasure which God grants to the soul in the know ledge of the truth of 
faith. The victrix delectatio so badly misunderstood by the Jansenists, is the pleasure 
of love (delectatio dilectioque) of the supreme God, the pleasure in doing for the 
love of God what seems unpleasant to our nature. 
The main obstacle is the infirmitas, which can only be overcome by a great love 
which does not depend on our free will, but is infused in us by the Holy Spirit. 
125. Cum haec apparet distantia Veteris et Novi Testsmenti, quod lex ibi in tabulis, hie in cordibus 
scribitur, ut quod ibi forinsecus terret, hie delectat intrinsecus, ibique fiet praevaricator per 
occidentem litteram, hie dilector per vivificantem spiritus (De spiritu et littera 35,42). 
126. Inspiratio flagrantissimae et luminosissimae caritatis (De gratia Christi et de peccato originali 
1,35,38). 
127. Nolunt homines facere quod iustum est sive quia latet an latum sit sive quia non delectat. Tanto 
enim quidque vehementius volumus, quanto certius quam bonum sit novimus eoque delectamur 
ardentius. Ignorantia igitur et infirmitas vitia sunt quae impediunt voluntatem ne moveatur ad 
faciendum opus bonum vel ab opere malo abstrahendum. Ut autem innotescat quod latebat et 
suave fiet quod non delectabat gratiae Dei est, qua hominum adiuvat voluntates (De peccatorum 
merit is et remissione 2,17 ,26). 
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Necessity of the gratia adiuvans 
Grace is absolutely necessary. Augustine distinguishes two types of help (auxilia); 
certain auxilia are such that without them we cannot obtain what they help us to 
obtain, while other auxilia help us to obtain what we can obtain even without them. 
Grace belongs to the first type of auxilia and to show that no one can live justly 
without the help of God's grace (nemo sine Dei gratia recte vivit), Augustine gives 
several examples v.g. you cannot sail withour a boat, you cannot speak without a 
voice, you cannot walk without feet, etc. 
Pelagius held that with the help of grace man can more easily (jacilius) do what 
their free will commands them to do. Refuting Pelagius' treatise on free will (De 
libero arbitrio), Augustine tells him to remove the wordfacilius and he would be in 
perfect agreement with him: "We can never do anything, great or small, without 
God's help for without his help we can do nothing." 128 
What can man do without the auxiliumgratiae; without the help of God's grace? 
The Pelagian answer was too optimistic (we can do anything, grace is necessary 
only to make things easier for us); the Jansenist and Lutheran answer was too 
pessimistic (we can do nothing). 
Stated in the form given above, the problem is more philosophical than theo-
logical, but Augustine preferred discussing the problem expressed in a more theo-
logical form: What cannot we do without the auxilium gratiae? Misunderstanding 
Augustine, the Jansenists took a too pessimistic view of the problem. 
Augustine's answer to the question can be briefly given in the following three points: 
i. Without grace man cannot avoid sin. "Through grace," says Augustine," we not 
only obtain remission of our sins, but also help not to commit sins."129 As usual 
Augustine sees the problem in relation to salvation history and, as we have already 
seen, he sees three moments in this history; between its begining, between the 
possibility of not sinning (posse non peccare) which is a minor freedom (libertas 
minor), and its end, the impossibility of sinning (non posse peccare) which is the 
128. Sive parum, sive multum, sine illo fieri non potest, sine quo nihil fieri potest. 
129. Sanat ergo Deus non solum ut deleat quod peccavimus, sed ut praestet etiam ne peccemus (De 
natura et gratia 26,29). 
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greater freedom (maior libertas), there is a long period during which man is not 
free from sin (the necessitas peccandi), punishment for the abuse made with the 
libertas minor. The necessitas peccandi does not mean that all man 's actions are 
sinful, that man sins with every action he does, but means that man is in a state of 
sin and so unable to avoid sin with his sole efforts. 
ii. Without grace man cannot lead a pious life, namely he cannot do good (non 
posse recte agere). Grace is neccessary for each single act (ad singulos actus) man 
does, and is especially necessary for the first act of faith (initium fidei) and final 
perseverance (pe rseve rantia final is). 
iii. Without grace we cannot do any "truly" virtuous acts. Augustine held, against 
Pelagius, that pagan virtues are not true virtues, and based this harsh opinion on 
two biblical texts: "Without faith it is impossible to please God" (Heb 11,2); and 
"Whatever does not proceed from faith is sin" (Rom 14,23). An act is good not 
because its object is good but because of its end: "You should therefore realise that 
virtues are distinguished from vices not from one's actions but from the end for 
which an action is done."130 An act is not truly virtuous unless it is referred to God; 
even if its aim is good, it cannot be really virtuous, for if an action is not for God 
(ad Deum) it must be for its own self (ad se ips as) and so it would be an act of pride 
(inflatae et superbae sunt). 
But what can human nature do without the help of grace, without the auxilium 
gratiae? To have a balanced view of Augustine's doctrine on the necessity of grace, 
we must also say that Augustine always held that the image of God impressed in 
man's soul could not be destroyed by sin: it was only darkened. To prove this 
Augustine quotes Rom 2,14: "Gentiles who have not the law do by nature what the 
law requires" because "what has been impressed by God's image at creation was 
not totally destroyed; what make man's soul rational certainly remained together 
with the natural faculty which makes a rational animal (man) feel and do." 131 
Even the most evil of men, continues Augustine, cannot live his whole life 
without doing some good deed, for in all men there is a natural goodness (quandam 
130. Noveris itaque non officiis, sed finibus a vitis discernendas esse virtutes (Contra Julianum 4,3,21). 
131. Gentes quae legem non habent naturaliter ea quae legis sunt faciunt (Rom 2, 14 ). (Quia) non 
omnimodo deletum est quod ibi per imaginem Dei cum crearentur impressum est... remanserat 
utique id quod anima hominis nisi rationalis esse non potest: (in omnibus) ilia naturae qua legitimum 
aliquid animal rationale et senti! et facit, (remansit) (De spiritu et littera 28,48). 
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sui generis probitatem), which is enough for the foundation and the progress of the 
city of the world: "We read and hear and know certain facts about such people", 
says Augustine, "facts which are according to justice and which we cannot blame, 
but we should justly and really praise: and yet if we were to examine these actions 
with reference to their end, we will notice that they are hardly worthy of praise and 
defence for their goodness." 132 The reason for this is the fact that these people do 
not direct their actions to God (ad Deurm): there is no true justification (iustitia) 
where there is no worship of the one true God. 
Grace is given only to those who cooperate with it. "God, who is our helper," 
says Augustine, "cannot help us unless we willingly try to do something, for God 
works in us our salvation not as if we were insensible beings like stones or rocks, 
which he created without will or reason."133 Elsewhere Augustine expressed the 
same idea with these words: "He is not one who helps us if we do nothing; he does 
not cooperate if we do not strive .. .. Be Jed, but you must run."134 Again, in one of 
his letters he writes: "Free will is not taken away when help is given to us, but help 
is given to us because our free will is not taken away" 135 for free will has not been 
destroyed by Adam's sin. "The freedom which has been lost," says Augustine, "is 
the freedom from death and sin"; man has lost his libertas minor, 'minor freedom', 
the posse non peccare (the possibility of not sinning) after Adam's sin, it is impossible 
for man not to sin (non posse non pee care) as we have already explained, therefore 
no one is free to do good without God's help, for our captive free will is only 
capable of sinning.136 We have already said in what way these statements should be 
understood: Augustine never meant that free will had been destroyed by sin, but 
that free will cannot help us to lead a virtuous life, if man 's will is still enslaved by 
sin, and has not been liberated by God's grace. 
132. Quaedam facta vel legimus vel novimus vel audivimus quae secundum iustitiae regulam non 
solum vituperare non possumus, verum etiam merito recteque laudamus, quamquam si discutiantur, 
quo fine fiant, vix inveniuntur quae iustitiae debitam laudem defensionemque mereantur. 
133. Adiutor enim noster Deus, nee adiuvari potest nisi qui ali quid etiam sponte conatur, quia non sicut 
in lapidibus insensatis aut sicut in eis, in quorum natura rationem voluntatemque non condidit, 
salutem nos tram Deus operatur in nobis (De peccatorum merit is et remissione 2,5,60). 
134. Non enim adiutor est ille, si nihil agatis; non enim cooperator est ille, .. . si nihil operamini ... 
Ducimini, sed currite et vos (Sermo 196, 13). 
135. Neque enim voluntatis arbitrium ideo tollitur quia iuvatur sed ideo iuvaturquia non tollitur (Epistula 
157,2, 100). 
136. Non est liber ad agendum bonum sine adiutorio Dei (nam) liberum arbitrium captivatum nonnisi 
ad peccandum valet. 
.., 
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All this shows the need of prayer 
A clear proof of the need of prayer is the fact that the Church prays for God's 
help, and this fact helped Augustine to answer the objections of the Pelagians who 
continually insisted that God does not command the impossible and so they wrongly 
concluded that prayers of intercession are not necessary. The Church prays, for 
prayer is the general law of Christian life. 
To the Pelagian objection, Augustine replied admitting the truth that God does 
not command the impossible: "God does not command the impossible, but when 
he commands us to do something he also tells us to do what we are able to do and 
ask for help when we are unable to do something with our efforts alone." 137 Augustine 
also adds: "Once we strongly believe that the good and just God does not command 
the impossible, we are told what to do when something easy is asked from us, and 
what to ask for, if something difficult is requested from us. Everything becomes 
easier through love, through which Christ's burden becomes light. ... This is why it 
has been said that his commandments are not difficult; but if to someone they 
might appear difficult let him consider the fact that God would not have said they 
were not difficult unless there was a loving heart for whom they would not be 
difficult and would ask for what he lacked, to do what was requested of him." 13f 
Then Augustine concludes: "Law has been given that grace might be sought, and 
grace has been given that law might be obeyed." 139 
Grace is given us through prayer. God, writes Augustine, 140 wants us to fight tht 
good fight with our prayers rather than with our own efforts, for the efforts we neec 
in this world are given us by him to whom we pray. Fight against the world witl 
137. Non igitur Deus impossibilia iubet sed iubendo admonet et facere quod possis et petere quod no 
possis (De natura et gratia 43,50). 
138. Eo ipso quo firmissime creditur Deum iustum et bonum impossibilia non potuisse praecipen 
hinc admonemur et in facilibus quid agamus et in difficilibus quid petamus. Omnia quippe fiur 
facilia caritati, cui uni Christi sarcina levis est .. Secundum hoc dictum est: praecepta eius gravi 
non sunt, ut cui gravia sunt, consideret non potuisse divinitus dici: Gravia non sunt, nisi qui 
potest esse cordis affectus cui gravia non sunt, et petat quo destituitur, ut impleat quod iubetur (D 
natura et gratia 69.8.30) 
139. Lex ergo data est ut gratia quereretur, gratia data est ut lex impleretur (De spiritu et littera 19,34( 
140. Opus imperfectwn 6,15. 
141. Epistula 130,16,29. · 
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your prayers, Augustine wrote to Proba, 141 pray with hope, pray with faith and with 
love, pray with perseverence and patience for whatever God's law commands is 
accomplished only if He who commands helps, inspires and give. 142 Prayer is 
necessary for us as much as the grace we obtain through prayer; without prayer 
there is no salvation, as there is no salvation without grace. Prayer is especially 
necessary for final perseverance which we can never merit, but can always achieve 
through prayer. 143 
Prayer is necessary for us to obtain grace, and grace is necessary for us to be 
able to pray. We know, says Augustine, 144 that God has some gifts which he gives 
even to those who do not pray, e.g. the initiumfidei, and some gifts which he only 
gives to those who pray v.g. final perseverance. Besides the gift of the initiumfidei, 
to those who do not pray, God also gives the grace of prayer. 
Nature and Grace 
We have atready mentioned the Pelagian argument to prove that sin has not 
weakened human nature, that human nature was not changed by Adam's sin. Pelagius 
argued that sin is not a substance but an action: how could it therefore change and 
weaken human nature? We also mentioned that Augustine did not deny that sin was 
not a substance, but added that sin was an action which estranged us from God, 
and, depriving us of God has been our death: 
"If you prefer a discussion there is no objection and it would also be worth 
while if a very strong faith precedes our discussion, that faith which make us not 
think that human nature cannot be vitiated by sin, that faith based on the authority 
of the Scriptures, which will help us to find out how it could have been possible for 
our nature to be vitiated by sin. We have learned that sin is not a substance, must we 
not also admit that eating is not a substance? But there is some connection .. . for 
food is a substance; to abstain from food is not a substance but if one abstains 
totally from food, the substance-body languishes, loses its strength, and if it continues 
142. Quidquid lex Dei iubet, nonnisi eo qui iubet adiuvante, inspirante, donante, completur (Opus 
impeifectum 6,30). 
143. Suppliciter mereri potest (De dono perseverantiae 5,19). 
144. De dono perseverantiae 16,30. 
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to live in some way, it can hardly be asked to take that food, by abstaining from 
which, it has been weakened." 145 
Our nature is a fallen nature through a very serious act of pride; the seriousness 
of Adam's sin is due to the fact that Adam enjoyed complete freedom and could 
therefore easily obey God's commands; he disobeyed God through pride, and man's 
disobedience to God brought disobedience within himself, for his passions rebelled 
against the dictates of reason as we have said before: man was punished for his 
disobedience to God, by disobedience within his own nature. 
Man, once fallen, could never redeem himself. Through sin man lost the freedom 
he enjoyed in the garden of Eden, namely having full justice together with 
immortality. 146 Once lost, this freedom could not be given back except by the One 
who could give it.147 The reason for this statement, says Augustine, is found in the 
Bible; to the proof from the Bible Augustine adds a metaphysical argument: "We 
are not helped by God to sin . . . but to do good; to obey the commandment of 
justice in all its implications is not possible for us unless we have God's help . .. 
just as the eye of our body is not helped by light, if it is closed to this light and runs 
away from it; but to see the eye needs the help of light and will not see unless 
helped by light; we can say the same with regard to God who is the light of the soul: 
he helps the sight of our soul to do something good, which is according to his 
justice and not according to our nature. 148 Briefly, (i) Adam through his sin lost his 
friendship with God, only God could give him back his friendship; (ii) Adam lost 
145. Quia disputare vis non obest, immo etiam prodest, si firmissima procedat fides nee existimemus 
peccato humanam naturam non posse vitiari, sed divinis credentes Scripturis peccato earn esse 
vitiatam quomodo id feri potuerit inquiramus. Quoniam peccatum iam didicimus non esse 
substantiam, nonne adtenditur ... etiam non manducare non esse substantiam? A substantia quippe 
receditur ... quoniam cibus substantia est; sed abstinere a cibo non est substantia, et tamen substantia 
corporis, si omnino abstinetur a cibo, ita languescit...ita exhauritur viribus ... ut si aliquo modo 
perduret in vita, vix possit ad cum cibum revocari, unde abstinendo vitiata est (De natura et gratia 
20,22) (Cfr. note II). 
146. Libertas quae in paradiso fuit, scilicet habendi plenam cum immortalitate iustitiam (Contra duas 
epistulas Pelagianorum 1,25). 
147. Reddi non potest nisi a quo dari potuit (De Civitate Dei 14,11,1). 
148. Ad peccandum ... non adiuvamur a Deo; iuste autem agere vel iustitiae praeceptum omni ex parte 
implere non possumus, nisi adiuvemur a Deo ... Sicut enim corporis oculus non adiuvatur a luce, 
ut ab eadem luce clausus aversumque discedat, ut au tern videat adiuvatur ab eo neque hoc omnino, 
nisi ilia adiuverit, potest, ita Deus cui lux est hominis interioris: adiuvat nostrae mentis obtutum ut 
non secundum nostram, sed secundum eius iustitiam boni aliquid operemur (De peccatorum meritis 
et remissione 1,5,5). 
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his immortality, he became mortal, and therefore through his efforts, he could never 
conquer death; (iii) Adam became subject to disorders, for his passions were no 
longer controlled by reason: because of these disorders he could never enjoy interior 
stability. Adam therefore needed a Mediator to reconcile Him with God and so free 
him from the situation into which he had fallen through his sin. 
Once these points are accepted, we will immediately convince ourselves that 
the whole problem is not about human nature itself, but about the need of salvation 
for human nature (de sanandis, non de instituendis naturis agitur) This is the thesis 
which Augustine develops in his De natura et gratia in answer to the De natura of 
Pelagius. The first question Augustine asks is: "Is our nature a fallen nature, or not? 
His answer is quite clear: "It is vitiated and needs a doctor" ( vitiata est, medicum 
imploret); to clarify his idea, Augustine makes reference to the parable of the good 
Samaritan; this led medieval theologians, when discussing original sin, to state that 
through this sin man has been despoiled and wounded in his nature.149 Augustine 
speaks of a natura vitiata and asks what vitium is. It is not sin or guilt, says Augustine, 
but an imperfection, a defect, an evil in the sense we say blindness (caecitas) is a 
vitium oculorum, a defect in the eyes. Applied to men, for Augustine the vitium is a 
privatio bonorum, a lack of something good. 15° For Augustine the bona naturalia 
(natural goods) are not only what belongs to the integrity of human nature but also 
all that is the object of our deepest desires, and therefore he considered death, 
disorderly concupiscence and separation from God as the vitia, the defects and 
evils which make human nature a natura vitiata. 
Having said this, we can easily understand that Augustine's position vis-a-vis 
Manichaeism and Pelagianism was, what we may call, a middle why, the veritatis 
medium. The Pelagians, as we have seen, held that concupiscence in our present 
state, ut nunc est, is not an evil but a natural good, while the Manichees considered 
concupiscence and all the material world as something evil. Augustine took the middle 
way: concupiscence ut nunc est is a vitium naturae, a defect of fallen nature, and does 
not come from God but from the world (non provenit a Patre sed a mundo). Again 
the Pelagians held that men could do good through their own free will without God's 
help, while the Manichees held that our evil actions do not derive from our free will. 
Augustine replied telling the Manichees that God made man upright (Qoh 7,29) and 
telling the Pelagians: "If the Son makes you free, you are free indeed (Jn 8,36). 
149. Spoliatus gratuitis vulneratus in naturalibus. 
150. Vitia naturalium sunt privationes bonorum (Enchiridion 3, 11 ). 
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We can now see the relation there is between nature and grace. 
Human nature, says Augustine, is capax Dei, capable of having God, for man 
has been created to God's image and likeness, an image which has not been destroyed 
by sin but only darkened and defaced. Augustine, during his last years, was 
continually repeating what he wrote in his Confessions: 0 Lord, you have made us 
for you, and our hearts are restless until they rest in you, 151 and what he wrote in 
The City of God that our soul will not lose its poverty unless it acquires blessedness, 
for there is nothing to satisfy it unless it is God himself. 152 
We have several times repeated that concupiscence in our present state (ut nunc 
est) is a defect, a vitium, but this is not what God wanted human nature to be: 
immunity from disorderly concupiscence is something worthy of man's dignity, 
and this is what God had willed. The same thing can be said with regard to death 
which is of no good for anyone (nulli boniest). Fear of death is not an opinion but 
something natural, 153 for the human soul which is immortal and which of its nature 
is the forma corporis (the form of the body) postulates the immortality of the body. 
These ideas of Augustine made Baius identify nature with grace; but Baius 
misunderstood Augustine, who clearly distinguished' between nature and grace. 
Augustine wrote that God, in one and the same moment, created human nature and 
infused his grace in it, 154 and that it is natural for man to have faith as well as love, 
to have faith and to have love is a grace given to believers ... nature does not 
distinguish a man from another, but faith distinguishes a man who believes from a 
man who is an unbelieveer. 155 
Augustine not only affirms the distinction between nature and grace, but also 
insists on God's transcendence and on the gifts God gave to man at creation i.e. his 
friendship, and immunity from death and concupiscence. "God is the Being whom 
no man or angel can pretend to approach for he is the Subsistent Being .... Before 
this Being, what is man ... ? Who can ever hope to approach him? Who can ever 
151 . Fecisti nos, Domine, ad te, et inquietum est cor nostrum donee requiescat in te. 
152. Nee expleat indigentiam suam nisi utique beata sit, eique explenda non sufficiat nisi Deus (De 
Civitate Dei 12, 13). 
153. Mortem quippe horret non opinio sed natura (Sermo 172, I). 
154. Simul in eis condens naturam et largiens gratiam (Civitate Dei 12,9,2). 
155. Posse habere fidem sicut posse habere caritatem naturae est hominum; habere autem fidem 
quemadmodum habere caritatem gratiae est fidelium ... illa utique natura ... non discernit ab homine 
hominem; ipsa vero fides discern it ab infideli homine (De praedestinatione sanctorum 5, I 0). 
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presume to be in him?"156 If God did not come down to man, man could not rise up 
to God: "I come to you, because you cannot come up to me." 157 Only the grace of 
divine adoption can bridge the gap between man and his Creator. Augustine continues 
to insist on this, spe~ng on God's image in man: because man is created to the 
image of God, man needs God, for each image tends towards its examplar, on the 
other hand man is infinitely unlike God for he is far below, far away from Him, 
very different from him.158 
Once we admit this, we cannot admit that grace is something which belongs to 
the integrity of our nature but is something which has been given to us as a gratuitious 
gift of God, who to his eternal name (nomen aeternitatis) has added a merciful 
name (nomen misericordiae) by coming down to our lowliness to lift us up to his 
greatness. Not only is man's elevation a gift of God, but also immunity from death 
and concupiscence, is a gift from God. It is through a marvellous grace of God 
(mirabili Dei gratia) that man could not die, for man is mortal because of his animal 
body (condicione corporis anima/is) , but can be granted immortality as a gift from 
the Creator (beneficia Conditoris). In the garden of Eden man, adorned with grace 
(vestitus gratia) was not ashamed of his nakedness, but deprived of grace (spoliatus 
gratia) he felt ashamed and felt the need of covering his nakedness- God's grace is 
truly something great.159 
Predestination 
Augustine discussed predestination towards the end of his life, and wrote three 
treatises De corruptione et gratia, De praedestinatione sanctorum and De dono 
perseverantiae. Augustine did not discuss predestination theoretically, but factually, 
from a historical point of view, in concreto, basing himself on the data of revelation. 
"God wants all men to be saved", says Augustine, "and acquire the full knowledge 
of truth, but not in such a way as to destroy their free will, on the good and bad use 
of which they will be justly judged. Infidels act against God's will when they do 
not believe the Gospel, but they do not overcome him; on the contrary they defraud 
themselves of the supreme good and subject themselves to great punishments, 
156. £narratio in Ps. I 0 I ,2, I. 
157. Ego descendo quia tu venire non potes (£narratio in Ps. 121,5). 
158. Longe intra, remotissimum, Ionge dissimillimum (Sermo 7,7). 
159. Gratia quippe Dei magna erat (Contra Iulianum 18,82). 
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submitting to his power in their torments, having refused the gifts of his mercy. "160 
In the order of intention, that is, considering divine wisdom in itself, God wills the 
salvation of all men and gives the means of salvation to all, but considering the 
actual fact- and this is what Augustine does -not all men are saved. 
Speaking about predestination, Augustine does not refer simply to God's 
foreknowledge but also to his will; nor does he refer to the pure order of intention, 
independently of the reality that from all etenity there will be the chosen and the 
damned. Augustine's chief preoccupation is the gratuity of salvation and of the 
very merits which lead to it, which are all divine gifts given to whom God wills 
through his mercy (per misericordiam). And so Augustine defines predestination 
as the foreknowledge and preparation of God's benefits by means of which all 
those who are liberated are certainly liberated. 161 In Augustine's definition only 
those who are certainly liberated (certlssime liberentur) are mentioned; there is no 
mention of those who are not saved; with regard to the damned, Augustine says 
that their judgement is not gratuitiously given or given without just cause; they are 
damned by a judgement (per iudicium). 
Many of Augustine's statements on predestination may cause great difficulties 
for us, if we forget that Augustine is speaking of predestination not theorically but 
factually, in concreto. Another point we must constantly keep in mind is that 
Augustine continually insists on the gratuity of all the gifts God vouchsafes to men 
that they may be saved. All Augustine's statements are based on these facts: (i) 
God's gifts, and above all, final perseverance are gratuitious and are not in any way 
merited by us; (ii) God wants all men to be saved (vult omnes homines salvos fieri), 
and gives to all men the means for salvation, but in actual fact, not all are saved; 
(iii) God from all eternity knows who are these saved, and their number. On account 
of Adam's sin all are a mas sa damnata, all have been redeemed by Christ, but some 
refuse salvation and are therefore damned. 
160. Deus vult omnes homines salvos fieri et ad agnitionem veritatis venire, non sic tamen ut eis 
adimat liberum arbitrium quo vel bene vel male utentes iustissime iudicetur. Quod cum fit infideles 
quidem contra voluntatem Dei faciunt cum eius Evangelium non credunt; nee ideo tamen eum 
vincunt, verum seipsos fraudent magno et summo bono magnisque poenalibus, experturi in 
suppliciis potestatem eius cuius in donis misericordiam contempserunt (De Spiritu etlitera 32,58). 
161. Praescientia et praeparatio beneficiorum Dei quibus certissime liberentur quicumque liberantur 
(De dono perseverantiae 19,35). 
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It is in the light of the above statements, that we must understand the great 
many texts in which Augustine speaks of the identical situation of both the damned 
and the elect before the all-powerfulness of God's will: their cause is the same 
(eadem causa, causa communis), for sin has made all a mass of perdiction (massa 
perditionis): even infants. Augustine is so logical in his arguments that he considers 
unbaptised children as damned, as we have already seen. He even says, with regard 
to an infant dying before baptism in spite of all the efforts made to have the infant 
baptised, that the infant died because God did not want Baptism to be given.162 
Augustine's statements here should not be understood as meaning that God does 
not want some to be saved, as the words just quoted seem to imply. God wants all 
men to be saved (the antecedent will- voluntas antecedens of later theologians), 
but because of the lack of saving grace, for some (like the infant mentioned) God 
wills that they will not be saved (the consequent will, the voluntas consequens of 
later theologians). Augustine's statements appear categorical because he does not 
make this distinction explicitly, although it is found in his writings, which, on 
predestination, apparently contradict themselves; actually there is no contradiction, 
for Augustine sometimes speaks of the antecedent will of God who wants all men 
to be saved, and sometimes of the consequent will of God (the damnation of those 
who refuse salvation, and refuse it 
162. Deo nolente quad detur baptism us (De dono perseverantiae 3 1 ). 
163. Etiamsi nullus liberaretur, nemo potest Dei vituperare iustitiam (Enchiridion 99; De dono 
perseverantiae 18). 
